Introduction
An asset's price is unaffected by its location of trade. This classic finance paradigm predicts that claims on the same set of risky cash flows are assigned the same value irrespective of the international markets these claims are trading at. In other words, markets are perfectly integrated. A recent empirical study by Froot and Dabora (1999) shows that this is not true for three of the world' s largest and most liquid companies. This paper presents an empirical analysis of market integration for Dutch blue chip stocks that are cross-listed at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The data set consists of all bids, quotes and trades from July 1997 to June 1998. Included are two of the three stocks studied by Froot and Dabora (1999) : Royal Dutch and Unilever. The main contribution of this paper is that it adds an intraday perspective to market integration for markets as geographically distinct as Europe and the US. The one-hour trading overlap facilitates study of market integration. Although many event studies have looked at the effects of the start of cross-listing (IPO), still relatively little is known about mature trading in both markets. A basic understanding of such trading is increasingly important since not only do companies consolidate at a global level, they also raise capital in foreign equity markets by cross-listing their shares. As an example, figure 1 depicts the number of non-US companies listed at the NYSE from 1956 to 1998. This number has grown exponentially which has resulted in 379 cross-listings at the end of 1998. The surge of Electronic Communication Networks (ECN) as still another trading platform will add to this growth in dispersed trading of securities as does the trend to extend trading hours amongst the established exchanges. The Dutch data set is tailored to study of mature trading for cross-listed stocks, since it includes stocks such as Royal Dutch and Unilever that arguably represent the most mature level of US trading a non-US stock can achieve. Both stocks enjoy highly liquid trading in New York, they are registered shares as opposed to ADRs and they are members of the S&P500.
Amsterdam and New York have the potential of being integrated for a number of reasons. Market integration is assessed both indirectly through the study of intraday patterns and directly by modelling price discovery during the overlapping trading hour.
The indirect assessment builds on Werner and Kleidon (1996) who study UK stocks crosslisted at the NYSE. To the best of our knowledge this is the only intraday study on integration for stocks trading in different continents. Other papers have either studied intraday co-movements of 4 entire markets, Goodhart and O'Hara (1997) , or have modelled individual stocks using close to close returns, e.g. Froot and Dabora (1999) . Well-known drawbacks of the latter approach are a potential bias due to heavy last minute trading --Amsterdam is a clear-cut example --and imperfect synchronisation due to different closing times.
The direct assessment of market integration is based on price discovery during the hour of trading overlap. The model developed in Hasbrouck (1995) is used to study the extent of market integration and the origin of information. The remainder of the introduction will elaborate on these two approaches.
Indirect Assessment of Market Integration
If markets are perfectly integrated and trading overlaps at some point in time, the intraday patterns in volatility, volume and spread for both markets combined should resemble the U-shape documented for single markets. Such indirect assessment of market integration is done for UK stocks cross-listed at the NYSE in Werner and Kleidon (1996) . The current paper takes the same approach for Dutch stocks cross-listed at the NYSE. The current data set, however, is more tailored to the study of market integration, because the Amsterdam and New York market are institutionally more comparable. The London Stock Exchange is a dealer market, whereas the NYSE is not. Although the NYSE has a trading floor, it is not a pure dealer market, because many orders arrive at the floor via the electronic Superdot system, which resembles an auction market.
The specialist matches orders from both the floor and the system and, if necessary, takes inventory to meet his exogenous objective of 'smooth' price discovery. The most relevant difference between a dealer and an auction market pertaining to the present study is the level of commitment to bid and ask quotes. In auction markets, issuing a quote is similar to writing an option, because of the inherent commitment to a trade at the quoted price. Whereas the best quotes in New York are disciplined by the Superdot system, the best quotes in London are at most indicative. Hence, quoted spreads in New York are more likely to reflect the real cost of trading.
Amsterdam and New York are institutionally comparable, because both markets resemble an auction market with a specialist supporting trade. In Amsterdam, the specialist or 'hoekman' does not oversee a trading floor, but supports trading in an electronic market. All quotes issued are quotes that traders commit to. It is not a pure auction market, because the specialist still provides liquidity if necessary. These differences in market structures are reflected in the results.
Whereas Werner and Kleidon could not discriminate any immediate change in London quoted
spread upon of the opening of New York, this study can.
In their review of the high frequency literature in finance, Goodhart and O'Hara (1997) consider the U-shape pattern in volume, volatility and spread as the best known stylised fact. The intriguing feature of these intraday patterns is that they are difficult to explain theoretically, at least using basic models that split agents in informed traders, uninformed or liquidity traders and market makers (Kyle (1985) , Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , Pfleiderer (1988, 1989) ).
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The latter model is in the spirit of Kyle but further sophisticates liquidity traders into discretionary and non-discretionary. The group of non discretionary traders must trade a given number of shares in a certain time interval e.g. fifteen minutes, whereas discretionary liquidity traders can choose when to trade, but have to trade within a pre-specified larger time interval e.g. the full day. The Nash equilibrium of this trading game is such that trading volume is concentrated and may take place at any time in the trading day. This high volume time interval is further characterised by high volatility, since it attracts all discretionary traders including the informed.
Theoretical models can explain the empirical U-shape patterns for volume and volatility, but cannot explain a similar pattern in spread. On the contrary, the Admati and Pfleiderer model predicts an inverted U if the intraday volume pattern is U-shaped, since the high volumes exist for reasons of lower spreads! Most likely the assumption of discretionary traders is flawed. The theoretically less rigorous model of Brock and Kleidon (1992) shows that transactions demand at the open and close of trading is stronger and less elastic than at other times of day. At the open, there is a strong demand for two reasons. First, public news announcements prior to the open provoke trade. Second, the need to rebalance portfolios based on intensive price discovery at the previous day's market close is another trigger for trade. Similarly, when prospective market closure foreshadows an inability to readjust portfolios for 17 hours overnight and over 60 hours on Friday night, investors are focused on the need to rebalance before the closed period arrives.
The Brock and Kleidon model is used to hypothesise intraday patterns for stocks listed on exchanges in different time zones. If both markets are perfectly integrated and have some, not necessarily long, trading overlap, intraday patterns will be U-shaped for the overall trading period.
The null hypothesis of complete integration is depicted in figure 2.
The hypothesised overall U-shape pattern needs further sophistication triggered by a strand of literature referred to by O'Hara (1995) as 'Information and Multimarket Activity'. She classifies information as systematic and non-systematic. The non-systematic information pertains to one single security only, whereas the systematic information pertains to all securities combined, i.e. the market. The opening of the US market potentially reveals systematic information. Lin (1991) has summarised previous studies in this field which show that movement in the US market affects other markets, but not vice versa. Fortunately, the systematic and nonsystematic information from US trading can be discriminated, since they start to be revealed at different times. One hour prior to the opening of New York trading, systematic information is revealed through the start of US index futures trading and through US macro economic announcements. The opening of New York then allows for non-systematic or private information to be revealed through the start of trading in the individual cross-listed Dutch stocks. These observations require further sophistication of the null hypothesis of market integration. The systemic information disclosed one hour prior to the opening of the NYSE is expected to affect trading in Amsterdam through increased volume, volatility and spread. The perfect market integration hypothesis, however, does not allow new, private information to be revealed through 6 the start of trading in the individual stocks at the NYSE open, since this information should have been incorporated through trading in Amsterdam. Hence, the null hypothesis is an overall Wshape pattern for volatility, volume and spread with a peak at 14:30 Central European Time (CET), since this is the time when systematic US information is revealed. 
Direct Assessment of Market Integration
The increased volume and volatility for the hour of overlap accompanied by higher spreads clearly reject the hypothesised intraday patterns for perfectly integrated markets. These findings are consistent with informed trading for this time of day. But if markets are not perfectly integrated as judged from a full-day perspective, are they integrated for the hour of trade overlap? Do prices reflect the same fundamental information, or, alternatively, is price discovery integrated for this hour? Price differentials may exist but should be transient for arbitrage reasons. In econometric terms, both price series may be non stationary, the price difference series should be stationary.
The null hypothesis of market integration during the overlap is tested by evaluating whether or not both price series are cointegrated.
If volume is high, prices are volatile, spreads are large indicating informed trading and if price discovery is integrated, arguably the most interesting question is: in which market does this new, private information originate? Hasbrouck (1995) has developed a practical econometric 7 approach based on an error correction model to answer this question. In addition, model estimates yield impulse response functions that are informative on the long-term effect of a unit impulse on one of the exchanges and the adjustment rate of the other exchange.
Model estimates based on five-minute midquote returns show that both prices series shares are indeed cointegrated for all shares and, hence, markets are integrated by definition.
Interestingly, results on the origin of information are mixed for Dutch stocks. Some stocks are clearly led by Amsterdam in the overlapping trading hour which means that information primarily originates in the Dutch market, some are led both by Amsterdam and New York, some are led solely by New York.
The results of both approaches to market integration show that markets are not perfectly integrated in that they can be viewed as one market open from 9:30 CET until 16:00 EST. The reason for this is that volume, volatility and spreads for all stocks during the overlapping trading hour are substantially higher than what is predicted based on well-documented U-shape patterns for single markets. Zooming in on this relatively intense trading during the overlap, markets appear to be integrated in that price discovery on both sides of the Atlantic reflects the same underlying new information. Price differentials exist but are transient.
The remainder of the paper is structured in five sections. Section 2 describes the setting and introduces the model to estimate the intraday patterns. Section 3 documents the intraday patterns for volatility, volume and spread for both markets. In section 4 price discovery for the overlapping trading hour is modelled. Section 5 re-estimates the intraday patterns based on a stratification of the stocks based on the results of section 4. Section 6 concludes the paper with a brief discussion of the results.
The Setting: Amsterdam and New York
This study is based on trade and quote data from the Amsterdam stock exchange (AEX) and the NYSE for July 1, 1997 through June 30, 1998. Seven Dutch blue chip stocks cross-listed in New York have been selected for the current study: Aegon, Ahold, KLM, KPN, Philips, Royal Dutch and Unilever. Although three other Dutch companies were also cross-listed at the time, they are not included because of too short trading history in New York. Although studies that focus on intraday patterns are numerous and consistently document Ushape patterns, the comparison of patterns for cross-listed stocks is limited. Werner and Kleidon (1996) are the first to study market integration through intraday patterns. Their approach is used for the current sample because it both allows for the strong firm-specific effects and it offers a benchmark. The intraday patterns for volatility, volume and spread are estimated using ordinary least squares regressions. In order to estimate a cross-section model incorporating all stocks, the variable of interest is scaled to make up for firm-specific means. London. In addition, it enables statistical testing of sudden jumps or drops in a straightforward manner. Going from time interval j to j+1 the model not only allows for a new intraday average, but also for a confidence interval solely based on the day over day volatility for that particular fifteen minutes of the day. Effectively, it makes the results more robust to outliers, since these will not only affect the interval average but also enlarge confidence intervals for that specific interval.
The intraday patterns
The empirical intraday patterns for volatility, volume and spread are estimated and discussed in this section. The model estimates are tabulated in table 2 and depicted in figure 3a and 3b.
Amsterdam
The trades and quotes sample for Amsterdam is comprised of 261 trading days, which yields 7,308 fifteen-minute intervals. The inclusion of seven stocks in the sample thus results in 51,156
observations. The number of explanatory variables is 28, which is the number of fifteen-minute intervals in a day.
Volatility
The intraday volatility pattern in Amsterdam is determined by modelling fifteen-minute squared returns, which are based on trade prices. The empirical intraday pattern has the familiar Ushape, although somewhat distorted. The first remarkable difference with a pure 'U' is the sudden jump from 0.73 to 1.13 at 14:30 CET. Volatility jumps by more than 50%, which indicates that 
Volume
The volume pattern is determined by studying the total number of shares traded in each fifteenminute interval. The volume pattern closely resembles the volatility pattern: a U-shape with jumps at 14:30 and 15:30 and a drop at 16:00 to be followed by a record volume at the close. Although the jump at 14:30 is more restricted, 25%, the jump at 15:30 is comparable in size with the volatility jump, 50%. The intraday volume and volatility patterns combined clearly reject the hypothesis of perfect market integration, since under this hypothesis the 15:30 jump in volatility and volume would not exist. Both jumps are significant, since the jump to standard error ratios are 9.6 and 20.8 for 14:30 and 15:30 respectively.
The comparison to the intraday patterns for the UK sample shows that London volume and volatility do not jump on the 14:30 events in the US, whereas they do at the actual open of the NYSE, but to a lesser extent. In other words, the Dutch cross-listed stocks appear to be more sensitive to US events and NYSE trading.
Quoted Spread
The quoted spread pattern resembles the volatility and volume patterns with the exception of a relatively small jump at the close. At 14:30 the quoted spread jumps by 10% and the 15:30 jump is 5%. The spreads in the final two hours of trading are 5% to 10% higher than the previous 
Effective Spread
The remedy against the drawbacks associated with quoted spreads is to revert to ex-post measures of trading cost. Apart from the indicative character of quoted spreads in London, there are two other drawbacks associated with quoted spreads. First, the best bid and ask quote might not be backed by volume. If volume for these quotes is relatively small and the limit order book is not deep, a large sell order, for example, can only be executed by biting deep into the order book.
Only part of the total order can be executed at the best bid, the rest is executed against less favourable bid prices. On the other hand, trades might take place within the bid ask spread, because both buyer and seller might offer some margin to establish a trade. These are the main reasons for studying the ex-post, effective spread which is defined as twice the distance from the trade price to the midquote based on the best bid and offer at the time of the trade.
The shape of the intraday effective spread pattern is identical to the quoted spread pattern.
This strengthens confidence in the results documented for the quoted spread. Cost of trading increases with the opening of the US market with a 10% and 5% jump in effective spread at 14:30 and 15:30 respectively. Both jumps are significant, since the jump to standard error ratios are 11.0 and 7.1.
Interestingly, the effective spread in the first fifteen minutes compared to the rest of the day is larger than the quoted spread, indicating that market orders bite deep into the probably thin order book at the start of the day.
New York
The trades and quotes sample for New York is just like Amsterdam comprised of 261 trading days, which translate into 6,786 fifteen-minute intervals. The inclusion of seven stocks in the sample thus yields 47,502 observations. The number of explanatory variables is 26, which is the number of fifteen-minute intervals in a day. Compared to UK cross-listed stocks, Dutch stocks appear to be more sensitive to simultaneous price discovery in the domestic market.
Volatility

Volume
The intraday volume pattern at the NYSE has a shape similar to the volatility pattern. The volume drop upon the Amsterdam close is 25%. The differences with the pattern for UK stocks are relatively small, apart from higher volume in the Dutch stocks at the close. The drop is significant, since the drop to standard error ratio is 10.3.
Quoted Spread
The quoted spread intraday pattern reflects a single-legged "U". Spreads do not increase at the 
Effective Spread
The effective and quoted spread patterns have similar shape. The jump for the effective spread upon the close of Amsterdam is less pronounced, 5% instead of 10%. It is a significant result, since the jump to standard error ratio is 5.5. Similar to Amsterdam the effective spreads in the first fifteen minutes are very large compared to quoted spreads.
The week with no trading overlap due to non-synchronous change to daylight savings time is studied to evaluate whether the intraday peaks for both markets are caused by the open or close of the other market. The intraday patterns shift in line with US market opening up one hour later compared to the other weeks in the sample. The period is too short, however, to find statistically significant results.
Price Discovery in the Overlapping Trading Hour
The increased volume and volatility for the hour of overlap accompanied by higher spreads clearly reject the hypothesised intraday patterns for perfectly integrated markets. These findings are consistent with informed trading for this time of day. But if markets are not perfectly integrated as judged from a full-day perspective, is price discovery then integrated for the overlapping trading hour? Price differences should be transient for arbitrage reasons. Hence, both price series may be non stationary, the price difference series should be stationary otherwise prices would drift apart without bound. The null hypothesis of market integration for price discovery during the overlap is tested by evaluating whether or not both price series are cointegrated.
If volume is high, prices are volatile, spreads are large indicating informed trading and if price discovery is integrated, arguably the most interesting question is: in which market does this new, private information originate? This question is addressed in Hasbrouck (1995) . In this paper an error correction model not only determines which market drives price discovery but also details the interaction between both markets for each stock.
14 To study price discovery in the overlapping hour five minute midquote returns have been calculated and studied. Midquotes are the preferred proxy for price for two reasons. First, quote returns are not subject to excessive negative autocorrelation that results from a bid-ask bounce present in trade price returns. This bias was first documented by Roll (1984) . Second, the sample of quotes is larger than the trade sample. The interval length is fixed at five minutes instead of two minutes or one minute, because these data were least affected by intervals not containing a quote and therefore uninformative. To facilitate comparison, the Amsterdam quote series are translated into dollars using day to day NLG-USD exchange rates. Admittedly, applying interday exchange rate series to intraday quotes is debatable. The impact on the results, however, is limited for two reasons. First, if intraday exchange rate returns are not correlated with stock returns, model estimates are less efficient but not biased. Second, the intraday volatility of the USD-NLG exchange rate is very small compared to the volatility of midquote returns.
To gain insight in the dynamics of the quote series, auto-and cross-correlations are summarised in table 3. These statistics provide several clues. Contemporaneous returns show strong positive correlation, ranging from 0.27 to 0.70. This is a first, strong indication that markets are integrated, i.e. price discovery reflects the same underlying information. The significantly positive cross-correlations with either AEX or NYSE lagged five minutes are evidence of potential lagged response to innovations in price discovery on the other exchange. First order autocorrelations are also significant although to a lesser extent. The fact that these are either positive or negative shows that the strong bouncing effect present in trade returns is not evident in quote returns. Significance of higher order auto-and cross-correlations is scattered, most dynamics is within one lag.
The correlation pattern in midquote returns is consistent with an error correction model as presented in Hasbrouck (1995) . The positive first order cross-correlations are potentially the result of 'error correction'. The model is represented as:
The validity of the model depends on the validity of two assumptions. First, the midquote series should be integrated of order one and, if this is true, both series should be cointegrated. DickeyFuller test statistics show that both these assumptions are valid for all seven stocks. The stationarity of the cointegrating relation, which is the difference between the midquotes in Before considering information shares of both exchanges as defined in Hasbrouck (1995) , it is useful to discriminate between long term and transitional contributions to price discovery.
The long-term contribution is a straightforward expression after rewriting the error correction model to a Vector Moving Average (VMA) model.
The stationarity conditions imply that the sum of all rows in Ψ(1) constitute the long-term impact of a unit impulse on each of the midquote prices. The cointegration condition ensures that this sum is equal for both rows. The economic intuition is that prices on both exchanges can differ only temporarily and will revert to a common implicit price. The arbitrage mechanism brings both prices in line in the "long-term". 
Intraday patterns by category
The intraday price discovery study based on the Hasbrouck model unambiguously shows that the Amsterdam and New York market are integrated, since they both reflect the same fundamental information. Such unambiguous conclusion cannot be drawn when looked at the origination of 
Conclusion
The question of market integration is increasingly relevant in a world where equity markets see more and more cross-listings. Werner and Kleidon (1996) study UK stocks cross-listed in New York and answer this question by documenting intraday patterns in volatility, volume and quoted spread. In this paper the same methodology is used to estimate these patterns for Dutch stocks cross-listed in New York. The implicit assumption in Werner and Kleidon (1996) paper is that their results are robust to differences in market structure. The London Stock Exchange is a dealer market and NYSE is not. The most interesting variable, the cost of trading, is hard to measure in a dealer market. Quoted spread, as studied by Werner and Kleidon, is a flawed proxy for cost of trading, since it is at most indicative. In the electronic market in Amsterdam, on the other hand, traders are committed to quotes. Hence, quoted spreads are an improved indicator of the cost of trading. This study also contains an analysis of ex-post, effective spreads to circumvent altogether the well-documented flaws of quoted spread as a proxy for cost of trading.
The intraday patterns documented for Dutch stocks are firm and show some pronounced intraday jumps and drops that are not at all or to a lesser extent present in the Werner and Kleidon study. The most remarkable jump is at 14:30 CET, the time US macro economic announcements are published and US index futures trading starts, which reveals US market sentiment. In Amsterdam, volatility, volume, quoted and effective spread jump 50, 25, 10 and 10 percent respectively. At 15:30 CET NYSE trading starts and this is the start of one hour of synchronous trade at both sides of the Atlantic. Again, volatility, volume, quoted and effective spread jump 50, 50, 5 and 5 percent respectively, which suggests a start of informed trading. As Volatility is proxied by the squared return for a specific fifteen minute interval. Returns are in basispoints. The interval return is calculated as the price prevailing at the start of the interval as is inferred from the last trade and the prevailing price at the end of the interval. Applying these rules without scrutiny will lead to arbitrary results for variance at the first fifteen minutes since quoting does not start immediately at the open. The first fifteen minute return in the day is linearly extrapolated from the x-minute return from the first midquote in the day to the prevailing midquote fifteen minutes after the open.
Volume
Volume is calculated as the number of shares traded in a specific fifteen minute interval.
Quoted Spread
Quoted spread is calculated as the average difference between the best bid and ask price in a specific interval. The spread for a specific fifteen minute interval is a weighted average of all prevailing spreads in the interval.
Effective Spread
Effective spread is calculated as twice the difference between the transaction price and the mid-point of the prevailing bid and ask quote. Effectively, this spread metric measures ex-post cost of trading. The effective spread for a fifteen minutes interval is a weighted average of all observed effective spreads in the interval. This table summarises the results of least squares regressions that establish the intraday patterns in trade price volatility, volume, quoted spread and effective spread. The patterns are based on a pooled regression after making up for stock specific means through scaling. Intraday heteroskedasticity is allowed for through standard deviations that depend on the time of day. The results are compared to UK patterns that are taken from Werner and Kleidon (1996) . To determine if both patterns are equal, t-statistics show whether or not the Dutch estimates are signficantly different from UK averages This table documents (i) the long term effect of a unit impulse in the midquote on both exchanges, (ii) the adjustment rate of the other exchange to this impulse and (iii) the information share of each of the exchanges.
Appendix: Variable Calculations
(i) The long term effect is the contribution of a unit impulse to the common efficient price.
(ii) The adjustment rate is defined as the time needed by the other exchange to incorporate half of the long term effect.
(iii) The last four columns contain intervals that include the information share of each exchange in the overlapping trading hour. The construct 'information share' is developed in Hasbrouck (1995) . It is defined as the proportional contribution of a market's innovations to the innovation in the common efficient price. The thick solid black line traces out the elongated U-shape that is the predicted intraday pattern for volatility, trading volume, percentage quoted and effective spreads under the hypothesis that Amsterdam and New York trading of Dutch cross-listed stocks is perfectly integrated. The thin solid black lines trace out two U-shaped curves that represent the predicted intraday patterns for each market under the alternative hypothesis that trading of Dutch cross-listed stocks is not perfectly integrated. This figure is the graphical representation of least squares regression results that establish the intraday patterns in trade price variance, volume, quoted spread and effective spread for seven Dutch stocks trading in Amsterdam and cross-listed at the NYSE. The time line refers to Central European Time (CET). The patterns for trading at the London Stock Exchange for UK stocks cross-listed at the NYSE are taken from Werner and Kleidon (1996) . Werner and Kleidon (1996) . This figure depicts the information share of each exchange in the overlapping trading hour. The construct 'information share' is developed in Hasbrouck (1995) . It is defined as the proportional contribution of a market's innovations to the innovation in the common efficient price. 
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